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Liable, but Not in Control? Ensuring Meaningful
Human Agency in Automated Decision-Making
Systems
Ben Wagner
Automated decision making is becoming the norm across large parts of society, which raises
interesting liability challenges when human control over technical systems becomes increasingly
limited. This article defines “quasi-automation” as inclusion of humans as a basic rubber-stamping
mechanism in an otherwise completely automated decision-making system. Three cases of quasi-
automation are examined, where human agency in decision making is currently debatable: self-
driving cars, border searches based on passenger name records, and content moderation on social
media. While there are specific regulatory mechanisms for purely automated decision making, these
regulatory mechanisms do not apply if human beings are (rubber-stamping) automated decisions.
More broadly, most regulatory mechanisms follow a pattern of binary liability in attempting to
regulate human or machine agency, rather than looking to regulate both. This results in regulatory
gray areas where the regulatory mechanisms do not apply, harming human rights by preventing
meaningful liability for socio-technical decision making. The article concludes by proposing criteria
to ensure meaningful agency when humans are included in automated decision-making systems,
and relates this to the ongoing debate on enabling human rights in Internet infrastructure.
KEY WORDS: automation, function allocation, human rights, Internet architecture, technology
policy, artificial intelligence, algorithms
自动化决策正成为大部分社会范围内的常态。当人类对技术系统的控制变得越来越有限时，
这就带来了有趣的责任挑战。本文将“准自动化”定义为人类作为一种基本的橡皮图章式机
制纳入一个完全自动化的决策系统。笔者研究了三种准自动化案例：自动驾驶汽车，基于乘
客姓名记录的边境搜索和社交媒体的内容调节。在这些案例中，个人能动性在决策中的作用
是有争议的。虽然有专门的调控机制进行完全自动化的决策，但如果人为例行公事做决定(橡
皮图章)，这些调控机制就不适用了。更广泛地说，大多数调控机制都遵循二元责任模式，试
图对人或机器进行监管，而不是寻求对两者共同调控。这便产生了调控机制不适用的调控灰
色地带，通过防止人类对社会技术决策承担有意义的责任而损害人权。文章最后提出了在人
类被纳入自动决策系统时确保意义能动性的标准，并将其与如火如荼的网络基础设施促进人
权辩论联系起来。
关键词: 自动化, 功能分配, 人权, 网络架构, 技术政策, 人工智能，算法
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La toma de decisiones automatizada se esta convirtiendo en la norma en grandes partes de la
sociedad, lo que plantea desafı´os de responsabilidad interesantes cuando el control humano sobre los
sistemas tecnicos se vuelve cada vez mas limitado. Este artı´culo define la “casi automatizacion“
como la inclusion de los seres humanos como un mecanismo basico de “rubber-stamping” en un
sistema de toma de decisiones que de lo contrario serı´a completamente automatizado. Se examinan
tres casos de casi automatizacion, donde la agencia humana en la toma de decisiones es actualmente
discutible: automoviles sin conductor, requisas fronterizas basadas en registros de nombres de
pasajeros y moderacion de contenido en las redes sociales. Si bien existen mecanismos regulatorios
especı´ficos para la toma de decisiones puramente automatizada, estos mecanismos reguladores no se
aplican si los seres humanos estan siendo entidades de “rubber-stamping” mientras existen las
decisiones automatizadas. En terminos mas generales, la mayorı´a de los mecanismos regulatorios
siguen un patron de responsabilidad binaria al intentar regular la agencia humana o de maquinas,
en lugar de buscar regular ambas. Esto da como resultado areas regulatorias grises donde los
mecanismos reguladores no aplican, lo que perjudica los derechos humanos al evitar responsabili-
dades significativas para la toma de decisiones socio-tecnicas. El artı´culo concluye al proponer
criterios para garantizar una agencia significativa cuando se incluye a los seres humanos en los
sistemas de toma de decisiones automatizados, y se relaciona con el debate en curso sobre la
habilitacion de los derechos humanos en la infraestructura de Internet.
PALABRAS CLAVES: automatizacion, asignacion de funciones, derechos humanos, arquitectura del
Internet, polı´ticas tecnologicas, inteligencia artificial, algoritmos
Introduction
There has been an increasing awareness in the last two decades that the
Internet is a socio-technical system (Brey, 2005), comprising both human and
technical aspects (Kitchin & Dodge, 2011). Growing discussion about the role of
humans in Internet infrastructure is reflected in the literature on Internet
governance (Denardis, 2011; Johnson & Post, 1996; Mueller, 2010), content
moderation (Roberts, 2014, 2016; Wagner, 2016), and—more broadly—the invisi-
ble human labor that keeps much of the Internet going (Ekbia & Nardi, 2014;
Irani, 2015; Kushner, 2013; Mathew, 2014). This tension in the relationship
between people and technology is particularly evident in regard to Internet
platforms, whose claim to a legal and technical neutrality in how they manage
the content on their platforms is central to their ability to conduct business
(Crane, 2011; Kelsey, 2008; Pasquale, 2016). However, the claim that they are
neutral actors requires them to hide the invisible human labor involved in
curating their platforms (Riesewieck, 2017), and instead claim that intelligent
technical systems are able to solve many content moderation problems
(Wolverton, 2018).1
This is also reflected in debates on the human rights architecture of the
Internet,2 with many authors making proposals to strengthen the implementa-
tion of human rights through technical architecture (Gill, Redeker, & Gasser,
2015; Suzor, 2018). While John Perry Barlow’s 1996 Declaration of the Indepen-
dence of Cyberspace could be seen as a first document of this kind, numerous
similar documents have followed. While the 2005 Tunis Agenda for the
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Information Society is notably weak on this topic, more recent documents such
as a 2012 proposal to the European Parliament for “Human Rights Based
Communications Infrastructure” (Wagner, 2012), the IETF “Guidelines for
Human Rights Protocol Considerations”3 (Cath & Floridi, 2017) and the Council
of Europe’s “Study on the human rights dimensions of automated data
processing techniques and possible regulatory implications” (Wagner, 2018a)
have discussed how to integrate human rights into Internet infrastructure
extensively.
While some of these human rights oriented documents focus primarily on
defining technical techniques (IETF, HRCBI, HRBCI) or governance principles
(WSIS, CoE, HRBCI) by which the governance of the Internet should take place,
only very few deal with the specific challenge of human agency. The Council of
Europe study is the only one of the reports mentioned above which specifically
tries to embed human agency into a human rights Internet infrastructure by
arguing that “important elements (such as discretion) of decision-making
processes cannot be automated” (Wagner, 2018a, p. 42). A similar statement by
the Article 29 Working Party in their interpretation of the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), argues that it implies a “prohibition on fully automated
individual decision-making, including profiling that has a legal or similarly
significant effect” (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, p. 9).
This follows a trend related to the algorithms and automation literature
which both questions and emphasizes the importance of human agency
within otherwise vastly automated and mostly Internet-connected technical
systems (Gillespie, 2014; Kitchin, 2017; Pasquale, 2015). This article examines
the relationship between human agency and human rights Internet architecture
in order to attempt to understand whether there is a necessary role for human
agency in human rights Internet architecture and, if so, what that role
should be.
Imagining Human Rights in Socio-Technical Internet Architecture
When studying the role of human agency in Internet architecture, one of the
key questions that comes to the fore is the challenge of function allocation. While
it is clear that many functions conducted within the Internet’s architecture—such
as moving packets or displaying websites—can be conducted only by machines,
many others, such as content moderation or ensuring the physical delivery of
items ordered, could be completed either by a machine or a human. Thus, while
only infrequently discussed as such, function allocation is a highly relevant and
politically contested question for many aspects of Internet architecture. For
example, while some politicians claim that Facebook should automatically find
and detect terrorist content and remove it, others—such as the Council of Europe
Expert Group on Internet Intermediaries (MSI-NET)—argue that only humans
should make such content moderation decisions.4
The standard method to determine whether machines or humans should best
be used in certain parts of a system has been to use the MABA-MABA lists first
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published by Fitts (1951). These lists are typically used to decide whether a
machine or a human can better fulfill a task (Figure 1).
However, since the development of this list, there has been considerable
debate on whether this list—which Sheridan (2000, p. 203) describes as the “the
function allocation counterpart of Moses’ 10 commandments”—is relevant from
a human rights perspective, with Billings (1991) proposing human-centered
automation as a way of “keeping the human front and center as automation
technology in one form or another continuous to engulf us” (Sheridan, 2000,
p. 209). One of the key aspects of this human-centric approach to function
allocation is to ensure that a “human operator [is] in the decision and control
loop” (Sheridan, 2000, p. 209).
This key recommendation of Sheridan (2000) has translated into many
recommendations made about human rights infrastructure. While MABA-MABA
lists do not explicitly use the term human rights, many of the terms they use
suggest that their human-centric approach is essentially attempting to ensure that
human judgment and discretion also flows into decision making. As noted by
Billings (1991, p. 7): “automation is simply one of many resources available to the
human operator, who retains the responsibility for management and direction of
the automation and the overall system.” A similar argument is made by Fitts
(1951, p. 7), who suggests that the “nebulous ability we call judgment also
appears to be unique in the human.”
This assumption made by Billings (1991) and others is also reflected in the
literature on automated weapons systems, where it is argued that it is preferable
to keep a “human in the loop” for several reasons (Crootof, 2016; Roff & Moyes,
2016). For one, it is assumed that improving the quality of decisions made by
automated systems by including humans in the process will limit the risks of
their implementation. Thus, some organizations focused on promoting human
rights in Internet infrastructure have argued that it is important to maintain the
option for human intervention. For example, a recent Council of Europe study on
automated decision-making systems states:
Figure 1. The Fitts List (Sheridan 2000, 204).
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While algorithmic decision-making is increasingly adept at replacing
human decision-making, important elements (such as discretion) of
decision-making processes cannot be automated and often become lost
when human decision-making processes are automated.5
Based on the basic logic of function allocation, it could thus be argued that
human decision making is an important part of what could be considered to be a
human rights–based Internet architecture. What is interesting is that while some
reports do not touch on the question of human agency at all, those that do so
explicitly require it. This suggests that those individuals who have engaged with
the concept of human agency in relation to human rights infrastructure believe
some level of it to be a necessary condition for safeguarding human rights. This
article examines the extent to which keeping humans in the decision loop—that
is, ensuring meaningful human agency in decision-making processes—is necessary
to safeguard human rights.
The claim that keeping a human in the decision loop is necessary to safeguard
human rights is consistent with what both Sheridan (2000) and Billings (1991)
argue for as a human-centric approach to automation. It is also consistent with
the arguments developed by the Council of Europe Expert Group on Internet
Intermediaries (MSI-NET), which suggest that the allocation of many key
decision-making functions to humans is important to safeguard human rights.6
Given that the current literature on function allocation and existing statements of
important expert groups suggest that some level of human discretion should be
safeguarded in regard to function allocation in developing a human rights
Internet architecture, this claim seems like a useful starting point to analyze the
role of human agency within such an architecture.
To understand what this claim means, we will consider several examples of
cases in the context of Internet architecture where humans are currently kept in
the loop. This will help us understand what basic assumptions are made about
human decision making within Internet architecture (broadly understood), in
relation to machine decision making, and help us understand what other reasons
might exist for including humans in the loop beyond merely improving the
quality of governance. It will be suggested that many assumptions about “human
agency and ethical humans vs. impartial machines” do not serve well in
designing human rights into Internet architecture.
Keeping a “Human in the Loop”? Three Cases
For a wide variety of reasons, many organizations choose to keep a human in
the loop when they operate automated technical systems. This approach is one of
the most typical responses to mostly automated systems to ensure that the results
provided by a computer algorithm are not the sole reason for decision making,
but that the decision involves human decision making as well. There are many
different fields where this type of interaction between human and machine is
increasingly common, with the machine suggesting a solution to a computer
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operator that the computer operator can respond to before a final decision is
made. The following cases are presented as a diverse set of examples of this
phenomenon, to demonstrate some of the challenges associated with including
humans in the loop.
Self-Driving Cars
Perhaps the most obvious example of such behavior involves self-driving cars
and their drivers. Smart and partially self-driving cars such as the Tesla Sedan
are permanently connected to the Internet, and as such can be considered to be
large, fast, and dangerous Internet of Things (IoT) devices. This is particularly the
case when they are being driven by amateur rather than professional drivers,
who have not received special training in the handover procedures which exist
between self-driving autopilot systems and human drivers.
While private companies that operate self-driving cars are typically still
required by law to have a human driver present in the car, humans are able to
intervene only in order to prevent an accident, or when some other error occurs.
However, the time required for a person to transition from an “automated state”
to a “manual state” where the driver has full control remains relatively high,
typically taking around 10 seconds for basic reassertion of control (Kyriakidis
et al., 2017; Lu, Coster, & de Winter, 2017; Merat, Jamson, Lai, Daly, & Carsten,
2014), and around 30–40 seconds “to resume adequate control” (Merat et al., 2014,
p. 281). At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that requiring human
drivers to take control of the vehicle is not a good solution, as “disengagement of
automation is not a particularly practical method for keeping drivers in the loop”
(Merat et al., 2014, p. 274).
Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that human drivers are not necessarily
fully in the loop, simply because their presence is required in a technical system.
Rather, it can be argued that the presence of drivers in self-driving cars is to
assure the public that their safety is being taken care of, and that a specific person
will be liable in the event of an accident. Because current research suggests that
individual response times are considerable, it has to be asked how useful a driver
would actually be in the case of an emergency. If an effective response requires a
reaction time of less than 10 seconds, this would seem quite difficult for a human
driver to achieve. This is particularly the case as the errors that are produced by
automated systems are not the same as those produced by humans and,
consequently, are very difficult for humans to predict. Machine errors in
automated driving are typically associated with the correct identification of the
objects perceived by sensors, while human driving errors are typically associated
with being able to provide sustained attention to a specific task over long periods
of time. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that frequent users of automated
driving technology mostly blame other humans rather than their own automated
systems for any accidents they experience while driving (Levin, 2016; Luckerson,
2015). However, other reports suggest that at least some of the accidents occurred
while the cars were in self-driving mode (Pritchard, 2015). There is even some
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suggestion that the companies involved blame human drivers, even when the
algorithm is actually at fault (Levin, 2016; Luckerson, 2015).
In response to these challenges, some authors have proposed alternative
solutions to the challenge of human/computer agency that would increase rather
than decrease the agency of individual drivers. To give an example of such an
alternative, the integration of an “ethical knob” (Contissa, Lagioia, & Sartor, 2016)
would allow drivers to decide how self-interested or how community-interested
(i.e., the ethical model: egotistical or communitarian) they would like an
automated vehicle to be. The vehicle would then make decisions which were
more altruistic or egoistic based entirely on the ethical choices of the driver. Such
a solution could “giv[e] back to the passenger the moral decisions and the
judgement as to which outcome is more acceptable” (Contissa et al., 2016, p. 9).
However, this approach also ensures that the dominant frame of plausible agency
remains focused on the driver, leaving the associated assignment of liability
clearly focused on the human driver. Admittedly, the integration an ethical knob
within an IoT device at least ensures that humans have a greater level of agency
more closely aligned to the level of personal liability that they have in the
process.
Police Searches Based on Passenger Name Records and Social Media Data
Another interesting example of the kinds of human intervention often
involved in automated systems concerns police officers conducting passenger
searches based on algorithms used to analyze passenger name records (PNRs)
and social media data. Such automated systems are used to identify potential
criminals on flights using the PNRs and other typically publicly available data of
the individuals on a flight, such as social media data purchased from private
companies to enrich the PNRs. The identification is not made with 100 percent
certainty; rather, the algorithms generate statistical probabilities of individuals
being likely to be part of a certain group of criminals, and individual police
officers then decide at which threshold of probability they wish to check whether
the hypothesis made by an automated system is in fact correct. Based on
passengers’ PNR data and other publicly available social media data, particular
passengers might then be selected by police officers for further inspection at the
border. This decision-making process does however serve to blur the boundary
between whether police officers themselves make the decision to search an
individual suspected of drug smuggling or terrorism, or whether the decision is
made by the algorithm. While the officers are free to do whatever they want in
theory, in the context of the socio-technical system they are embedded in, they
will de facto end up doing certain things that the algorithm suggests.
At an initial stage, the decision-making process seems relatively clear. Border
agents are given computer output, which they are asked to interpret and based
on which they make an informed decision (Saunders, Hunt, & Hollywood, 2016).
However, such an understanding of the socio-technical system mistakes the wider
role of the police officers engaged in complex information technology systems.
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The question that needs to be asked in this context is what the legal ramifications
are for an individual police officer in a specific legal jurisdiction of receiving a
recommendation by the PNR system. Is the police officer required to interpret the
response of the automated system as a “tip” and investigate it? Or are they able
to ignore the results of the system if they believe the individual to not pose a
threat or to have been falsely identified?
In general, the amount of time which border guards have to ascertain
whether a traveler is a threat or not is relatively short. For example, the
European Union (EU) Border agency Frontex suggests that an “EU border
guard has on average just 12 seconds to decide whether the traveler in front of
them is legitimate or not” (Fergusson, 2014, p. 15). It seems highly unlikely that
border guards would have significantly longer to assess the results of an
automated system. Furthermore, based on conversations with individuals
knowledgeable about the matter, it seems highly unlikely that a police officer
would not follow any individual leads provided by the automated system
(Karppi, 2018). This is in part because police forces use individual searches to
calibrate the system and ensure that they are targeting the right groups or
individuals. Thus, each search is not just a search for the purpose of finding
criminal activity, it also contributes to testing a police hypothesis about likely
criminals, for which both positive and negative responses are important to
validate the hypothesis (Kirkpatrick, 2017).
In consequence, if an individual police officer is not actively able to ignore a
specific individual recommendation of an algorithm to search a person at the
border, this also means that the decisions made by the algorithm are de facto
automated. While the “human in the loop” is of course necessary to conduct a
search, the police officer involved also ends up becoming liable for all decisions
made by that algorithm, because—at least formally—they were made by a human
(Degeling & Berendt, 2017; Ensign, Friedler, Neville, Scheidegger, & Venkatasu-
bramanian, 2017). Thus, the decision to search an individual is essentially made
in a quasi-automated fashion, which is essentially automated and includes a
human in the loop who does not have active agency at an individual level. If the
automated system makes a mistake in correctly or incorrectly identifying a
criminal, its results are likely to be optimized on this basis. However, there is
currently no framework in which software developers could be held liable for the
errors made by this system. By contrast, police officers are held liable personally
and directly for any mistakes made.7
What could be considered a counter-balance in this context is that at least
some of the police officers involved are able to adapt the algorithm based on its
effectiveness.8 By working out when it is effective and when it is not, police are
more easily able to refine the algorithm, increase its effectiveness, and reduce the
number of false positives it creates. At the same time, this form of agency is only
after the fact and would not influence the decision making of actual police officers
in individual cases. Here they are bound to conduct each search that the
algorithm suggests, if only to decide as a result that the algorithm is indeed
working or not.
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Outsourced Facebook Content Moderation
Another key system that employs humans in the loop is Facebook’s content
moderation system. Facebook employs numerous filters and algorithms to decide
what content individual users should see, as a result of which a large part of the
Facebook platform is automated. However, some parts of the system that
Facebook uses also include human input. This involves several Facebook content
moderation teams around the world who are responsible for responding to
complaints made by users about the content that they see on the platform. There
is also another group of humans who are responsible for filtering out images
which are considered to be against Facebook’s community standards. For this
purpose, Facebook employs a series of call centers to go through problematic
images uploaded to the platform which have been flagged by users. There has
been much debate about the lack of legal basis for Facebook’s content moderation
decisions, as “breastfeeding mothers are off limits [but] crushed heads, limbs,
etc., are OK as long as no insides are showing” (Anderson, 2012). Facebook makes
almost all content moderation decisions based on its terms of service and not
based on the law of any given country (Wagner, 2016). The automation or
nonautomation of content moderation decisions on the Internet’s largest social
media platform raises a key question for the governance of Internet architecture.
By changing the design of this large social media platform (Wagner, 2018c), it
may also be possible to better promote, protect, and uphold human rights—or to
harm them.
However, the role of these particular humans in the loop has previously
received far less attention than the online platform itself. While described by
some as the “trash collectors on the Internet” (Bouhs, 2016), they often work in
very difficult conditions with low pay and are typically given only a few seconds
to decide about each piece of content (Anderson, 2012; Bouhs, 2016; Roberts,
2014). So while algorithms have automatically identified pieces of content of
concern, the people tasked with confirming this barely have time to make a
meaningful decision. As the workers are paid very badly, these jobs do not attract
skilled workers and particularly not those who have any kind of legal or
technological qualifications. While they are certainly able to learn on the job, their
work consists of making quick decisions at the behest of a computer algorithm—
which are in turn checked for validity and consistency by another computer
algorithm. In this sense, they are doing multiple rounds of coding of a large data
set in order to ascertain which images can stay and which can not. This is very
different from substantively deciding what content is placed on Facebook and
what is not (Wagner, 2016).
This raises the interesting question of why Facebook includes them in the
system at all. Part of the reason may be that they fulfill a function that cannot yet
be automated, although both Google and Facebook have acknowledged that they
are taking extensive steps to replace this kind of work with automated systems
(Wagner, 2016). However, it can also be suggested that much of their work is not
actually there to contribute to human decision making, but rather to suggest that
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humans—both the users of Facebook and the staff at Facebook—actually have
agency.
This suggestion comes from the primarily algorithmic construction of the
system by which Facebook presents individual cases to human reviewers for
review. This system has several components in its decision making, which
include:
1. How many users have complained about a piece of content;
2. What they have complained about, or;
3. How urgent Facebook considers the complaint;
4. Whether the media is reporting about the case yet, and;
5. Whether the complaint comes from a privileged source such as a law enforcement
officer or judge.
At the same time, the system of escalation is a complete black box to
Facebook users and the general public. They have no way of knowing whether or
not Facebook will respond to an individual complaint, how it will respond, and
whether a human will be tasked with any such response. While there are
currently debates about whether the new EU GDPR may provide a “right to
explanation” for algorithmic decisions (Goodman & Flaxman, 2016), it is entirely
unclear what this right would actually look like in practice (Wachter, Mittelstadt,
& Floridi, 2016), and whether it would be fit for the purposes discussed here
(Edwards & Veale, 2017). Despite this, it is important to acknowledge that the
GDPR provides numerous additional rights to users which should contribute to
shedding greater light on algorithmic decision making (Article 29 Data Protection
Working Party, 2017). However, it should be noted that these rights to
explanation only apply to automated decision making. Thus, it is conceivable that
by involving a “human in the loop,” companies could avoid this right to
explanation. The Article 29 Working Party acknowledges this and—similarly to
the proposal in this article—is concerned about human decisions as “rubber
stamping” or quasi automation. To avoid this, they suggest a set of criteria similar
to the ones proposed below; that is, to ensure meaningful “human intervention,
the controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful,
rather than just a token gesture” (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party,
2017, p. 10).
Numerous anecdotal reports in this context suggest that dozens of users need
to complain about a single piece of content for any action at all to be taken by a
human at Facebook. Aside from very urgent cases like self-harm or child sexual
abuse material, Facebook typically waits to see how many users take issue with a
specific piece of content before sending it to be checked by a Facebook staff
member. This threshold also seems to be based on an automated algorithm,
allowing an automated system to decide (based on the number of complaints)
which piece of flagged content is even seen by an individual reviewer, before
they are given a chance to make a decision on it. It should also be noted that the
current working conditions that many content moderators work in—particularly
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as part of outsourcing and subcontractor arrangements—are themselves likely to
violate numerous human rights (Riesewieck, 2017).
Thus, it seems reasonable to argue that Facebook includes humans in the loop
for a variety of different reasons. While this might suggest the presence of human
agency at some levels, humans are so deeply embedded in the algorithmic systems
that decide things around them that it would be hard to call them actual decision
makers per se. Rather, the analysis seems to indicate they are actually embedded
there to suggest a limited degree of human agency within a highly complex system.
While human labor may be necessary in some areas, part of the reason for human
involvement seems to suggest human agency when there is actually very little.
Challenges Faced by the “Human in the Loop” Model
Quasi-Automation as a Challenge
The uncomfortable reality about much of the discussion about safeguarding
human rights in Internet architecture by putting a human in the loop is that the
debate ignores many of the vast number of cases in which significant automation
is taking place, as long as somewhere in the process a human is still “in the
loop.” Indeed, many supposedly automated or artificial intelligence (AI) systems
can function only because of the numerous humans who serve to fix the mistakes
that technical systems make, or who replace the decisions or technical systems
completely (Ekbia & Nardi, 2014; Kushner, 2013).
Yet, such rules are deceptively simple and do not do justice to the wide scale
of diverse human-technology interactions that already exist. However, existing
legal rules that, for example, forbid or allow certain forms of automation do so on
the assumption that a “human in the loop” means that an actual human “check”
will take place of the results of the automated system. If the person is able to only
rubber-stamp the results produced by the algorithm, then these systems should
perhaps more accurately be called “quasi-automated.”
This is particularly the case when the company involved spends little time or
energy ensuring that staff are properly trained or prepared to make these
decisions, or that they have sufficient time to make the decision themselves. This
is most evident in the case of Internet content moderators, in which low-paid
workers in the Philippines deal with thousands of cases of content moderation
per day for a few dollars per hour (Riesewieck, 2017). However, it is also evident
in the case of self-driving car drivers, where the design of the system puts drivers
in a situation where they evidently do not have sufficient time to decide. This is
particularly obvious in the case of amateur self-driving car drivers, who have
neither the relevant training nor the experience to understand the specific types
of mistakes made by automated self-driving systems.
Thus, in order for the human in the loop “claim” to be able to actually
promote human rights infrastructure, it needs to ensure that it avoids some of the
pitfalls discussed above. Similar decisional mechanisms already exist in the area
of aviation, where a specific classification of levels of automation exists.9 A similar
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classification has also been developed by the Society of Automotive Engineers for
self-driving cars (Milakis, van Arem, & van Wee, 2017). What is still under
considerable discussion is how to govern the different levels of automated driving
systems. In particular, in regard to many of the assumptions associated with
including a human in the loop, there is a need to ensure that human beings are
not used to simply rubber-stamp automated decisions in order to ensure
that technical systems meaningfully promote human rights. Another similar
classification has been developed by the Article 29 Working Party which suggests
that “To qualify as human intervention, the controller must ensure that any
oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than just a token gesture. It should
be carried out by someone who has the authority and competence to change the
decision. As part of the analysis, they should consider all the available input and
output data” (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, p. 10).
Based on these assumptions, I suggest the following criteria could be used to
more clearly define cases of quasi-automation:
1. Amount of time which the individual human operator has in relation to the
task: the lower the amount of time assigned to the human operator, the more
likely it is to be quasi-automated.
2. Degree of qualification that the human operator of the system has to fulfill the
specific task: the less qualified the individual is to fulfill a specific task, the
more likely it is to be quasi-automated.
3. Degree of liability which will be assigned to the human operator if it fails: the
greater the amount of legal liability a human operator is assigned for failure,
the more likely that humans are engaged in the process merely to ensure they
can take liability if the automated system fails (Dannenbaum, 2010; Maurino,
Reason, Johnston, & Lee, 2017).
4. Level of support the individual receives to conduct the task sustainably: many
of the tasks involved require very high degrees of concentration and often
involve making highly disturbing decisions in a short space of time. Here,
higher levels of psycho-social support or other forms of support are likely to
be an indicator that speaks against quasi-automation.
5. Adaption: the more a human operator must adapt to the system, instead of
the system being designed to serve the operator, the more the system is
quasi-automated.
6. Access to information: the human operator must have access to all relevant
information in order to be able to make the correct decision.
7. Agency: the human operator should have sufficient “authority [. . .] to change
the decision” (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, p. 10) and
should actually do so on a regular basis. If the only function of the human
operator is to regularly agree with the machine and only very rarely disagrees
with it, it is highly likely that the human operator’s agency is insufficient.
Only if a socio-technical system does not engage in quasi-automation with a
human in the loop (i.e., where they have responsibility but little agency), but
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actually systematically gives humans autonomy in making decisions—only then
can human rights be safeguarded.10 Human discretion cannot exist without basic
minimal conditions for that discretion to be exercised.
Assumption of Binary Liability as a Challenge
Another challenge related to understanding the role of human agency in
socio-technical systems is the assumption of binary liability. In the binary liability
model, either a human or a machine must necessarily be at fault, which in turn
links to a social argument about the need to blame someone (Marchant & Lindor,
2012). However, this model of social blame translated into binary legal liability is
unfit for a world of human-technical systems in which both equally contribute to
decision making. The fact that humans are in the loop should not absolve
automated systems—as is frequently currently the case—from being scrutinized
legally. For example, Article 22 of the EU GDPR includes a “prohibition on fully
automated individual decision-making, including profiling that has a legal or
similarly significant effect” (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2017, p. 9),
as well as specific safeguards for fully automated decisions.
Thus, by putting humans in the loop, companies can try to evade some of
these limitations and safeguards. Moreover, many companies currently use
human intervention in supposedly fully-automated systems—that is, to pretend
an advanced AI system is transcribing your voicemail rather than a call center in
the Philippines—without telling users that this is the case (Solon, 2018; Wray,
2009).
Liability is important to consider in human rights terms in regard to
remedying the harms created by technical systems (Shelton, 2015). For example,
as noted by United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, David
Kaye, in his 2018 report to the Human Rights Council, we do not yet know what
such a “remedy [could] look like in the digital age” (Kaye, 2018). People cannot
be blamed or held to account for just their discretion alone: the discretion of
technical systems needs to be considered in equal measure to ensure that—
beyond binary liability—the right to redress of individuals in the case of
rights violations is adequately considered. Here, existing redress and remedy
frameworks need to go beyond simply blaming a specific individual and
providing damages, but rather instead need to ensure that the social-technical
procedures that led to the rights violation are systematically changed.
One area where this area of regulation has developed considerably is in
regard to aviation, where less binary approaches to liability have developed
over time. This approach is encapsulated in Regulation (EU) No. 376/2014 on
the reporting, analysis, and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation, which
calls for a “just culture” which is “a culture in which front-line operators or
other persons are not punished for actions, omissions or decisions taken by
them that are commensurate with their experience and training, but in which
gross negligence, willful violations, and destructive acts are not tolerated.”11
This approach—also evident in several legal decisions made in the aviation
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sector, which focus on organizational liability (Br€uggemeier, 1991) rather than
on individual liability—is increasingly common in court rulings (Schebesta,
2017), which focus on improving socio-technical systems at scale rather than on
just identifying who is at fault.
This is particularly important in regard to specific limitations that currently
exist on the employment of fully automated systems in different areas of society.
From online content moderation to self-driving cars, there are a specific set of
rules for these types of automated decision making that apply only if there is no
human in the loop at all. As argued here, these rules for full automation should
also be expanded to situations of “quasi-automation,” where the human in the
loop barely has the time or the qualifications to make an informed decision. In
principle, there are some similarities between self-driving cars and the aviation
industry, where complex socio-technical systems made by the combination of
humans and auto-pilots are evaluated differently than those involving manually
piloted aircraft (Schebesta, 2017).12
Based on the suggestions made above, certain minimum standards need to be
set under which having a human in the loop no longer has an exculpatory
function which allows companies to pretend that the systems are under active
human control, rather than being essentially automated or quasi-automated. Such
a basic assumption by policymakers—it is hoped—could lead companies to think
differently about the way in which they treat and value those humans. While the
function of such “looped-in” individuals might become less relevant as their
ability to shield automated systems from liability is diminished, the employers
could also choose to give them more time, proper training, and essentially
greater levels of agency to avoid having their automated systems classified as
quasi-automated systems (i.e., where the human is clearly just a rubber stamp). If
the criteria followed above—in which employees have enough time, proper
training, all relevant information, etc.—are systematically followed, it could be
expected that this would also have a positive effect not just on the ability of these
individuals to safeguard human rights, but also on the working conditions of
these individuals themselves. Ensuring that they are able to do their jobs
effectively also means ensuring that they are able to do so in a manner that does
not violate their human rights to safeguard the rights of others.
More broadly, the analysis suggests that there is a need for a greater level
of agency for humans in the loop in order to ensure that the liability
exemption linked to their presence in the decision-making chain is not misused
(Dannenbaum, 2010). This would mean that humans with greater agency also
would need to accept greater liability and, at the same time, humans with
low levels of agency could not be expected to shoulder high levels of liability
(Crootof, 2016). While this may not directly be linked to the personal liability of the
humans themselves, liability exemptions are still a tangible legal benefit granted to
certain types of organizations. This should be the case only if any humans in the
loop have a meaningful human decision (Roff & Moyes, 2016) to make and not
if they are simply rubber-stamping the decisions already made by automated
systems.
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Rather disconcertingly, it is perfectly possible to interpret this article as an
acknowledgment that sole human responsibility is a “mental crutch” which supports
and is supported by existing ethical and legal notions about responsibility, both legal
and moral, whereas the reality of quasi-automated decisions is far more messy and
diverse (de Sio & Di Nucci, 2016). Importantly, the call for more human agency in
socio-technical systems can only meaningfully contribute to human rights, if it is
meaningful human agency and not simply a “quasi-automation” or rubber-stamping
of automated decisions. This rubber-stamping of automated decisions is likely to
harm human rights, as it obscures who is actually at fault while simultaneously
ensuring that the actual decision maker (the automated system) does not change,
given it is not recognized as the responsible party.
It is only by acknowledging that humans are not always fully agents or fully
autonomous that it is possible to shift the focus of the debate on these topics to
nonhuman agents which also possess forms of agency (Brey, 2005). Only by
shifting the debate away from whether humans or technology are liable for
mistakes—and by acknowledging that both, to a degree, are engaged in decision
making and therefore also responsible for their decisions—can a more meaningful
understanding of socio-technical agency be gained.
Conclusion and Paths Ahead
What conclusions can be drawn from this article? When studying human
rights in Internet infrastructure, the role of decision making is seldom looked at
in greater detail. This article argues that there is indeed a need for greater human
decision making in Internet infrastructure, but this will only be helpful if it
constitutes meaningful human decision making. If, by contrast, the rubber
stamping of automated decisions increasingly takes hold in a phenomenon
described here as “quasi-automation,” this is likely to weaken rather than
strengthen human rights. These type of quasi-automated decisions contribute to
confusions around binary liability which make it more difficult for individuals to
seek redress and claim access to rights, such as the GDPR’s right to explanation.
At worst, keeping a human being in the loop may serve as a human fig-leaf
for automated decisions made by algorithms and, thus, may even be detrimental
to developing human rights Internet architecture (Wagner, 2018b). However, at
best, if safeguards are implemented to prevent quasi-automation, ensuring
meaningful human discretion can contribute to developing a more effective
human rights Internet architecture. Once this has been clarified it may be possible
to implement this systematically across both policy and technical systems.
Pretending that human beings make decisions when they actually do not will not
contribute to anyone’s human rights and as argued here may actually harm them.
Ben Wagner, Ph.D., Assistant Professor and Director of the Privacy and
Sustainable Computing Lab, Vienna University of Economics and Business,
Austria [ben.wagner@wu.ac.at].
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Notes
1. They need this legal and technical neutrality in order to continue to be legally classified as the
managers of information platforms (like an Internet service provider) and not editors of an
information service (like the New York Times).
2. The term “human rights Internet infrastructure” is used throughout this article. In the way it is
used here this is meant to refer to Internet infrastructure which upholds, enables and promotes
human rights, both as a legal framework and a set of values.
3. https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-00.
4. For further details, see https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/committee-of-experts-
on-internet-intermediaries-msi-net.
5. See https://rm.coe.int/algorithms-and-human-rights-study-on-the-human-rights-dimension-of-aut/
1680796d10.
6. See https://rm.coe.int/algorithms-and-human-rights-study-on-the-human-rights-dimension-of-
aut/1680796d10.
7. This is the current state of the law in Europe, according to my conversations with people
implementing the PNR regime in several EU countries, and with those involved in negotiating the
PNR agreements.
8. The police officers who run these systems are able to calibrate it and insert additional variables,
for example, by adding an extra variable into the algorithm (“ticket paid in cash”) and seeing how
effective it is (“14 drug smugglers caught today compared with only six yesterday”).
9. See https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/fits/research/media/Det_App_Lvl_Atm.pdf.
10. Beyond the scope of the civilian context discussed here, a related concept of “meaningful human
control” has been developed in a military context by Heather Roff and Richard Moyes (2016). For
further details see http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-
FINAL.pdf.
11. See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32014R0376&from.
12. Regulation is much stricter for aviation than for self-driving cars. For example, there is no
requirement for black boxes in cars (as there is for airplanes), and the authorities often have
difficulty accessing all relevant data.
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